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1. Introduction 
A central quest in post-Cold War Africa has been to bring the Leviathan – the untrammelled 
ruler – to heel through constitutionalism, and, to a lesser extent, also decentralisation.1 The 
unbridled power of the imperial presidency, the one party state, and military regimes, has 
resulted, contrary to their projected justification of unifying and developing the new ‘nation’ 
bequeathed by the departing colonisers 30 years before, in underdevelopment, 
marginalisation of minorities, and in many countries fragility and conflict. When the proxy 
wars and the propping up of dictators, petty tyrants and kleptocrats came to an end, a vision 
and hope of governance in terms of constitutionalism and decentralisation emerged in some, 
if not most, parts of the continent; it would bring peace, democracy, good governance and 
development. This vision of decentralisation and constitutionalism has, however, only been 
partially realised over the past 25 years. The story of the Arab Spring of 2011 is similar in 
hope and outcome. 
Within this context, this conference seeks to examine the relationship between 
decentralisation and constitutionalism, giving rise to three interrelated questions: First, has 
the quest for decentralisation been dependent on a legal-political environment of 
constitutionalism? Put differently and prospectively, are any efforts towards decentralisation 
doomed in the absence or partial realisation of constitutionalism in a particular country? 
Secondly, is there a mutually supporting relationship between decentralisation and 
constitutionalism, where the former bolsters and buttresses the latter? Thirdly, in the absence 
or partial realisation of constitutionalism, has the quest for decentralisation been a vehicle for 
the building of constitutionalism? Or, more prospectively, does decentralisation hold the 
potential as a governance strategy, among others, that may advance the vision of 
constitutionalism. 
As with any ‘ism’ constitutionalism encapsulates values and goals. . In its liberal democratic 
form constitutionalism bears the following meaning: through a constitution state power is 
limited, exercised in a democratic accountable manner, and executed in a non-arbitrary way 
through a system of enforceable rules. In the African context the argument is that such a goal 
is too limited; constitutionalism should also entail the purposive use of state power to 
transform society to be more egalitarian and prosperous. Decentralisation, even though not 
sporting an ‘ism’, is no less value laden and idealistic. Decentralisation is championed for 
deepening democracy, enhancing development, countering the abuse of centralised 
governance, and accommodating diversity. It is thus readily apparent that decentralisation fits 
snuggly in the glove of an African perspective of constitutionalism. If the notion of limited 
government is a practice, then tolerance of the vertical limitation of central powers should 
follow. If democracy is a reality, then local democracy is merely the deepening of it. If the 
rule of law is the praxis, then decentralisation as a rule driven system of division of powers, 
should thrive. If transformative development is the national goal, then decentralisation is its 
primary agent. In this scenario, decentralisation would provide a secure encasement of the 
                                                          
1 See Nico Steytler, ‘Domesticating the Leviathan: constitutionalism and federalism in Africa’ (2016) 24 African 
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national project of constitutionalism. What if none of the four elements is present; is 
decentralisation then ineluctably doomed? Could decentralisation build constitutionalism 
from the bottom up?  
Practice over the last 25 years tells us that constitutionalism is not deeply rooted and evenly 
spread across the continent. Progress has been made: elections are held, election results lead 
to regime changes, courts are asserting their jurisdiction, and at an African Union level 
constitutionalism norms have been adopted. However, the gap between such AU Charters and 
similar sounding constitutions, and practice remains huge. In this context decentralisation has 
not flourished.  Whether decentralization has fostered constitutionalism, the argument is 
much less secure; perhaps the conference results will provide some nuggets of good news.  
Before delving in to the relationship between the two concepts, the preliminary step of 
defining them awaits. Constitutionalism is given different content, but is also rejected as a 
value in itself. Decentralisation is also contested terrain and the notion of it encompassing 
autonomous decision-making at a subnational level, is not uniformly shared. Much of the 
contestation may be attributed to the fractured nature of the African continent, a jostling of 
Anglophone, Francophone (which includes Lusophone) and Islamic constructs of the state. In 
sections 2 and 3 constitutionalism and decentralisation are defined, while in section 4 the 
challenges decentralisation encounters in the face of superficial constitutionalism are 
examined. In section 5 the focus is on whether decentralisation can be a catalyst for 
constitutionalism.  
2. Constitutionalism and the contest for content 
At least three broad approaches to constitutionalism can be discerned in the literature and 
state practice in Africa. The first is the classical ‘Western’ liberal-democratic notion of 
constitutionalism. The second, building on the first, adds a transformative element, while the 
third, ‘Islamic constitutionalism’, is ambivalent about the very basis of the first.  
Although there is no fixed and universally accepted definition of constitutionalism, the 
Western notion of constitutionalism is essentially one of limited government, with at least 
three basic elements enshrined in a constitution that are not readily amendable. 2 The first is 
democracy – the establishment of accountable government both in terms of representative 
and participatory mechanisms. The second element is that of limited government which 
entails the separation of powers which provides checks and balances and an enforceable bill 
of rights. The third element is the rule of law – governance under rules and not by arbitrary 
discretion - which includes the supremacy of the constitution, and its justiciability by an 
independent judiciary.3  
                                                          
2 B.O. Nwabueze Constitutionalism in Emerging States  (Hurst, 1973) 11;  Charles M. Fombad, ‘Challenges to 
Constitutinalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and 
Perspectives from Southern Africa’ (2007) 55:1 American Journal of Comparative Law 1-45; Charles Manga 
Fombad ‘Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment of the Prospects for 
Constitution Governance & Constitutionalism’ in Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds) The Resolution 
of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution & Post-Conflict Reconstruction (James Curry 
2008) 179-199; Charles Manga Fombad ‘Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections 
on Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects’ (2011) 59 Buffalo Law Review 1007-1108.  
3 Drawing on the work of Louis Henkin (‘Elements of Constitutionalism’ (1998) 60 The Review 1122), Fombad 
(‘Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms in Africa’, n 2) adds to the list of ingredients independent state institutions 
protecting constitutionalism, such as an ombudsman and a human rights commission. It is argued that such 
institutions are a nice to have but that their absence is not fatal to constitutionalism. Much more important is, as 
Fombad also suggests, the vigilant civil society and other institutions outside the state. 
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Although this construction is labelled ‘Western’ in origin, there are still significant 
differences in emphasis between the Anglophone and Francophone versions. In the latter, 
based on the Gaullist model of the Fifth Republic of France, the elements of the separation of 
powers and judicial review are much more attenuated than those in the Anglo-American 
model. The Gaullist model, which was slavishly copied in Francophone Africa as well as 
Lusophone and Maghreb countries,4 comprises a weak separation of powers, in which a 
strong presidency dominates both the legislature and the judiciary,5 legislating by decree the 
majority of laws and appointing judges (which come through the civil service and are timid in 
the enforcement of constitutional norms). For the French a US Supreme Court style of 
constitutional review was ‘a remote and alien phenomenon’.6 Constitutional review is thus 
limited most often to an abstract pre-promulgation review by institutions such as the conseil 
constitutional that are not part of the judiciary and populated also with ex-politicians.7 
Moreover, it’s a process which is not accessible to the public, only the legislature.8 This 
approach, Charles Fombad suggests, is ‘significantly influenced by the obsessive Gallic fear 
of the threat of legal dictatorship through a “government of judges”’.9  
The Western notion of constitutionalism is, as Yash Ghai points out, embedded in the 
emergence of capitalism which required and gained a limited state, protecting property and 
contract.10 But this is as far as the liberal democratic vision of constitutionalism goes: let the 
market-driven economy distribute social goods, rather than the state. The new constitutional 
enterprise in Africa sees a larger role for the state – a transformative one – where equal 
citizenship is the goal through enforceable socio-economic rights and substantive equality. 
South Africa’s Constitution has thus been called transformative as it is more than regulating 
the distribution of power, but seeks to use that power for the transformation of a highly 
unequal society.11 Transformative constitutionalism means that a constitution and its 
implementation by the state apparatus, including the courts, are committed to the 
transformation of a society towards social justice. This changes the state from a passive 
regulator of power to a ‘developmental’ one, where the constitution is a bridge from conflict 
and past injustices to an inclusive and just society. The notion of the ‘developmental state’ 
raises, however, the question whether it does not directly contradict the key element of a 
liberal democracy – the limited state. This seeming contradiction is more apparent than real; 
it does not sacrifice any of the liberal democratic values of democracy, separation of powers, 
human rights or the rule of law. Within a rational-legal framework it deepens democracy and 
                                                          
4 Fombad, ‘Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa’ (n 2), 1090; Fombad, ‘Post-1990 
Constitutional Reforms in Africa’ (n 2), 188-189. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Cibli Mallat ‘On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism’ (2006) 38:1 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 13-57, 14. 
7 Fombad, ‘Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa’ (n 2), 191; Serges Djoyou Kamga ‘An 
Assessment of the Possibilities for Impact Litigation in Francophone African Countries’ (2014) 14 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 449-473. 
8 Fombad ‘Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa’ (n 2), 191. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Yash Ghai ‘Chimera of constitutionalism: state, economy, and society in Africa’, Unpublished paper. 
University of Pretoria, 2011, available at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/Chimera_of_constitutionalism_yg1.pdf. 
11 Pius Langa, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351, 357; Karl Klare, 
‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146, 
150; Theunis Roux, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African 
Constitution: Distinction with a Difference’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 258-285, 260; Sandra 
Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Juta 2010).  
4 
 
gives effect to an expanded vision of human dignity and equality before the law by making it 
a substantive goal of government and not a product of market forces.12 
In a more direct conflict with ‘Western’ constitutionalism and its secular content, is ‘Islamic 
constitutionalism’.13 Scholars of Islamic constitutional law have debated whether the two 
concepts are irredeemably incompatible or whether there are overlaps between them, a debate 
of particular importance in Africa as at least 17 African countries are predominantly Muslim, 
as well as half of the Nigerian states. Although Raja Bahlul argues that there is no equivalent 
Arabic word for the Western concept of constitutionalism,14 many scholars refer to ‘Islamic 
constitutionalism’ with a distinct set of norms. Without doing justice to the variety of trends 
of Islamic thought, governance structures and practices over time and place, some of which 
favoured limited government,15 the key difference lies in the place of the Shari’a in a 
constitutional dispensation.16 The interpretation of the Shari’a, as ‘the comprehensive 
religious normative system of Islam, which is derived from interpretations of the Qur’an and 
Summa, or traditions, of the Prophet’,17 as the ultimate source of law on which constitutions 
draw, determines the nature of the state. Some scholars argue that notions of limited 
government, human rights, and democracy are embedded in the Shari’a and may have been 
practiced at different times.18 Others maintain that there is no compatibility as there is in 
theory and practice no separation of powers, no formal and institutional limitations of 
powers, equal rights or the rule of law, or a strong tradition of judicial independence.19 For 
some the religious basis and source of an Islamic constitution is the very antithesis of secular 
constitutionalism.20 Yet, there are differences of opinion on the impact of having the Shari’a 
as ‘the’ source of constitutionalism, or merely ‘one’ of the sources.21 In many constitutions 
the supremacy of the Shari’a is entrenched, ostensibly subordinating the text to a superior 
religious norm.22 This is, however, a simplification as the protection of Shari’a as a source of 
legislation is differently expressed and interpreted, and its impact depends on a number of 
contextual factors.23 Those who argued that Islam was adaptable to notions of limited 
                                                          
12Jan Erk  (‘Iron Houses in the Tropical Heat: Decentralisation Reforms in Africa and their Consequences’ 
(2015) 25 (5) Regional and Federal Studies 409-420, 413 (n 00), 419) notes that even Francis Fukuyama, who 
trumpeted the victory western liberal democracy (a limited government and a strong market place) in The End of 
History and the Last Man Standing (The Free Press 1992), has mellowed his stance in in the latest book, 
Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2014), where he envisages a more balanced role for the state in development. 
13 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na  ̀im, ‘Religion, the State, and Constitutionalism in Islamic and Comparative 
Perspectives’ (2009) 57 Drake Law Review 829-844; Nadirsyah Hosen ‘In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism’ 
(2004) 21:2  American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1-25;  
14 Raja Bhahul, ‘Is Constitutionalism Compatible with Islam’ in P. Costa and D. Zolo (eds) The Rule of Law: 
History, Theory and Criticism (Springer 2007), 515-542, 515.  
15 See Aver M. Emon, ‘The Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: History and Identity in Islamic 
Law”, in Sujit Choudry (ed) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (OUP 
2008) 258-286; Cibli Mallat ‘On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism’ (2006) 38:1 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 13-57; Saïd Amir Arjomand, ‘Islamic Constitutionalism’ (2007) 3 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Sciences 115-40.  
16 Arjomand, (n 15) 116. 
17 An-Na  ̀im, (n 13) 830. 
18 An-Na  ̀im, (n 13); Hosen (n 13); Azizah Y. al-Hibri, ‘Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of 
Demoracy’ (1992) 28 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 1-27; Bhahul, (n 14). 
19 Mallat (n 00) 44-47; Raja Bhahul (n 00) (no doctrine of separation of powers), 
20 Bhahul (n 00) 529 (Islam rejects secularism). 
21 Arjomand (n 00) 137. 
22 Asam Khalil ‘From Constitutions to Constitutionalism in Arab States: Beyond Paradox to 
Opportunity’ (2010) 1:3 Transnational Legal Theory 421-451. 
23 Clark B. Lombardi, ‘Sharia: “A” or “The” Chief Source of Legislation’ (2013) 28:3 American University 
International Law Review 737-774. 
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government took heart from the Arab Spring, commencing in Tunisia in January 2011 and 
spreading across north Africa and the Middle East. Five years later it is only at the place of 
origin, which was the most “Western” of Maghreb countries, that the principles of 
democracy, separation of powers, and a bill of rights were constitutionally entrenched.  
It is quite remarkable that in view of these deep seated differences a liberal democratic 
concept of the state was embraced by the African Union in its African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 (referred to as African Charter on 
Democracy).24 These principles were projected, not as Western constructs, but as “universal 
values and principles”,25 which include: “the universal values and principles of democracy 
and respect for human rights”; “the principle of the rule of law premised upon the respect for, 
and the supremacy of, the Constitution”; “regular free and fair elections to institutionalize 
legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of 
governments”; and the independence of the judiciary.26 Added to these objectives is the 
principle of “separation of powers”.27 With the prohibition of unconstitutional change of 
power being central to the Charter, 28 article 10 imposes the duty on State Parties to entrench 
the principle of constitutional supremacy and ensure that “the process of amendment or 
revision of their constitution reposes on national consensus, obtained if need be, through 
referendum.” The Charter also contained a developmental mandate: State parties must 
‘undertake to design and implement social and economic policies and programmes that 
promote sustainable development and human security.’29  
By April 2016, 48 of the 54 member states have signed the Charter and the ratifications have 
crept up to 24, half of which are Muslim countries, including the autocracy of the Sudan.30 
Only Libya, Eritrea, and Egypt have not signed the Charter and Morocco is not a member of 
the AU.31  
Following the AU’s conceptualisation of constitutionalism, a working definition of 
constitutionalism underlying this Seminar should, I propose, contains the classical tradition of 
constitutionalism (but frowns upon  the Francophone watered down version) and include the 
developmental dimension. It thus embraces the trail-blazing nature of South Africa’s 
Constitution, making a transformative goal a key element of constitutionalism.  
3. Decentralisation - towards a working definition(s) 
                                                          
24 The Charter was signed by 39 of the 54 AU member states in 2007 and came into force on 15 February 2012 
with the ratification by the 15th member state.  See Patrick J. Glen, ‘Institutionalizing Democracy in Africa: A 
Comment on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’ (2012) 5 African Journal of Legal 
Studies 149–175, 157. 
25 Preamble of Charter. 
26 Article 2 of Charter. 
27 Article 3 of Charter. 
28 Glen (n 00), 169. 
29 Article 9 of Charter. See also article 2 where the promotion of ‘sustainable development and human security’ 
are also one of the objects of the Charter.  
30 AU, ‘List of countries that has acceded and ratified it’, April 2016, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-sl-
african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf, accessed 20 August 2016.  
31 Morocco left the predecessor of the AU, the Organisation of African Unity, because of the latter’s recognition 
of Western Sahara. Recently, Morocco has made overtures to rejoin the AU 
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/morocco-asks-rejoin-african-union-32-years-160718060858072.html, 
accessed 20 August 2016. 
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The word ‘decentralisation’ usually refers to the process of dispersing power to subnational 
governments, and the term ‘non-centralism’ is often used as an equivalent.32 In the literature 
decentralisation is given both a narrow and broad meaning. When Daniel Elazar refers to 
decentralisation he describes the process of a discretionary transfer of powers by the centre to 
local governments on a non-permanent basis.33 This view is reflected in the African Union’s 
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and 
Local Development of 2014 (Charter on Decentralisation).34 Decentralisation is defined as 
‘the transfer of power, responsibilities, capacities and resources from national to all 
subnational levels of government with the aim of strengthening the ability of the latter to both 
foster people’s participation and delivery of quality services’.35 Although the term is used in 
an inclusive manner, referring to ‘all sub-national levels of government’ which in the context 
of the Charter refers to both regional and local governments,36 the devolution of powers is in 
terms of national legislation, and is not constitutionally entrenched.  
Decentralisation, when used in a federal context, refers also to the process of extending the 
autonomy of the constituent units, as opposed to centralising powers.37 For the purposes of 
this conference we are using this broad definition of decentralisation which includes both 
federal units and local governments. Plainly stated, it entails the dispersal of powers to 
subnational governments, whether in terms of a constitution or legislation, provided that such 
governments can make final decisions on a set of predetermined matters. Put differently, it 
refers to the subnational autonomous exercise of power with respect to a set of policy fields. 
This definition is flexible enough to make space for traditional authorities. Although their 
position does not arise from a constitution or legislation, they make final governance 
decisions in respect of communal land and customary law. In terms of this definition, at the 
top end of the continuum of decentralisation are federations, encased in constitutions, 
followed by local government which may (but usually does not) find constitutional 
recognition. At the bottom are traditional leaders who occupy an ambiguous and contested 
role in local governance.  
 
3.1 Federations and Federalism 
 
The rudimentary description of federalism is that of a system of government which has both 
self-rule and shared-rule elements. In some decisions, subnational units make their own 
decisions on matters of concern for that community, and for others it is done in conjunction 
with the central government. The basic structural elements of a federation are: the 
establishment of at least two levels of government; the division of powers (including taxing 
powers) between the centre and the constituent units; the participation of such units in the 
federal parliament through a second chamber; a system of intergovernmental relations; all of 
which are captured in a supreme constitution that is enforced by an independent judiciary.38 
In this regard a distinction should be drawn between constituent units and autonomous units. 
                                                          
32 Ronald Watts Comparting Federal Systems (McGill Queen’s University Press 1999) 71-75. 
33 ‘Federalism vs. Decentralization: The Drift from Authenticity’ in John Kincaid (ed.) Federalism (vol II Sage 
2011) 79-88.  
34 Adopted by the AU in April 2014, but has not yet come into operation. 
35 Art 1 ‘Decentralisation’, emphasis added.  
3636 See references to ‘sub-national levels’ in arts 5.4, 6.2, 7.5, 11.a, 16.4.a, 18.1.a.ii,  
37 See for example Tullia G. Falletti, ‘Decentralization in Time: A Process-tracking Approach to Federal 
Dynamics of Change’ in Arthur Benz and Jörg Brschek (eds) Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change and the 
Varieties of Federalism (Oxford University Press 2103) 140-166. 
38 Ronald Watts Comparing Federal Systems 7.  
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The principal difference lies in the asymmetrical devolution of power; because of the 
unevenness of diversity, autonomous units have a specific range of powers and institutions 
not shared with the rest of the country, while in most federations constituent units cover the 
entire country and have a universal set of powers.39 Furthermore, the shared rule component 
in federalism is often missing, as an autonomous unit ‘often wants to be left alone’.40 
Autonomy is motivated by the desire of a particular, mostly ethnic/cultural, group for self-
rule which is not shared by other groups. But there is much in common with federalism; they 
serve similar objectives, entail a division of power, and require judicial protection in terms of 
entrenched provisions on a constitution.  Examples of autonomous units in Africa are the 
status of Zanzibar within Tanzania41 and the elevated position of South Sudan under the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Constitution. 
 
The objectives of a federalism are in the main three-fold: The first is peace-making and state 
building in fragile states. The aim is to keep the state intact or settle conflict by 
accommodating minority (often ethnic) and marginalized groups in an inclusive system of 
government.42 A second objective is to limit the abuse of centralised government, usually 
concentrated in the hands of an authoritarian presidency, by devolving some powers away 
from the centre to subnational governments. A third objective is to enhance development: 
bringing government closer to the people to ensure that development projects reflect regional 
and local preferences, and resources are spread more equitably across the country. This will 
also ensure better service delivery and encourage greater public participation in development. 
 
Whether a federation achieves the objectives of federalism does not depend only on the legal 
provisions of a constitution, a necessary but not sufficient condition. Rather, Ronald Watts 
argues, it is determined by the federal nature or otherwise of a country, its political practices 
and processes. He suggests that the following “significant characteristics of federal 
processes”:43 
• A strong disposition to democratic procedures since they presume the 
voluntary consent of citizens in the constituent units; 
• Non-centralization as a principle expressed through multiple centres of 
political decision making; 
• Open political bargaining as a major feature of the way in which decisions are 
arrived at; and 
                                                          
39 See Markku Suksi, Sub-State Governance through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in 
Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions (Springer 2011), 81-106;  Yash Ghai, ‘Introduction: 
Nature and origins of autonomy’ in Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman (eds) Practising Self-Government: A 
Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions (Cambridge University Press 2013) 1-31, 16-19.  
40 Ghai ‘Introduction: Nature and origins of autonomy’ (n 00) 16. See further Sophia Woodman and Yash Ghai, 
‘Comparative Perspectves on Institutional Frameworks for Autonomy’, in Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman 
(eds.) Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 449-448, 473-478.  
41 On Zanzibar’s status as an autonomous unit, see Yash Ghai, ‘Zanzibar in Tanzania: From Sovereignty to 
Autonomy?’ in Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman (eds.) Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of 
Autonomous Regions (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 258-280. 
42 See, for example, Liam D Anderson Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity 
(Routledge 2013). 
43 Ronald Watts, ‘The Federal Idea and its Contemporary Relevance’ in Thomas J. Courchene, John R. Allen, 
Christian Leuprecht & Nadia Verrelli (eds) The Federal Idea: Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts  (McGill 
Queen’s University Press 2011, 16-17. See also Ronald L. Watts ‘Comparing Federal Political Systems’ in 
Alain-G Gagnon, Soeren Keil and Sean Meuller (eds) Understanding Federalism and Federation (Ashgate 
2015) 11-30, 13. 
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• A respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law since each order of 
government derives its authority from the constitution. 
It is immediately apparent that these characteristics are essentially the basic components of 
constitutionalism. The first characteristic reflects a commitment to democracy. In well-
established federations multi-party democracy is regarded as axiomatic; federalism without 
democracy is a contradiction in terms.44 The element of establishing “multiple centres of 
political decision making”, each centre drawing its authority from its own constituency, 
reflects the notion of limiting the power of the centre as a safeguard again the tyranny of the 
latter. The legitimate construction of the government of constituent units is predicated on the 
expressed free will of the population in multi-party elections. Consequently, whoever 
captures power at the ballot box should be recognized as the legitimate government of the 
constituent unit, even if it is politically opposed to the elected government at the centre. It 
thus requires tolerance by the central government of oppositional political forces. In 
particular, the constituent units’ right to make final decisions in areas of exclusive jurisdiction 
must be tolerated. Likewise, the constituent units must respect the centre’s sphere of 
competencies. The mutual tolerance of each other, thus opens the way for “open political 
bargaining” on issues of common concern.45 This open bargaining comes sharply to the fore 
when the institutions of shared rule, most notably the second house in the federal parliament, 
representing the constituent units or territories, restrain the power of the centre. The fourth 
element refers to the rule of law component of constitutionalism. First, the supremacy of the 
constitution, setting the parameters of the powers of all governments established in terms of 
the constitution, must be respected. Central to this respect is the notion of limited 
government; the central government’s powers are confined to the four corners of a 
constitution. Secondly, the constitution, as the solemn pact between the centre and the 
constituent units, cannot be amended by the centre acting on its own. Thirdly, in as much as 
the constitution must be respected, the laws authorized by the constitution, must also be 
obeyed; governments of both orders must act in terms of predetermined clear rules. Of 
particular significance are the rules governing intergovernmental fiscal relations. Fourthly, 
trust in the constitution and laws must be vindicated by an independent judiciary which is 
respected and obeyed by all governments.46    
3.2 Local Government 
 
A definition of local government is difficult as it encompasses a wide range of institutions, 
from the mega-metropolitan governments to small village councils. I have thus suggested that 
it more appropriate to talk of local governments (plural), which have in common that ‘there is 
no order of government between them and the communities they serve.”47 They are 
established either constitutionally (rarely) or by statute. An inherent quality of local 
governments is that they must be democratically elected and accountable to their 
constituencies. They perform a number of functions of which the following two are the most 
important. First, they provide basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and 
basic healthcare which are done as an exercise of their right to govern matters of local 
                                                          
44 See Michael Burgess and Alain-G Gagnon, ‘Introduction: Federalism and Democracy’ in Michael Burgess 
and Alain-G Gagnon (eds) Federal Democracies (Routledge 2010) 1-25.  
45 Woodman and Ghai state, with reference to autonomous units, that ‘a spirit of consultation and negotiations in 
good faith is vital for autonomy systems’ ((n 00) 466). 
46 Woodman and Ghai (n 00) 471. 
47 Nico Steytler, “Introduction” in Nico Steytler (ed) Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal 
Systems (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 3-6, 4. 
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concern, and hence are accountable to their community. Secondly, they often also perform 
specific central government functions delegated to them by the central government under the 
latter’s control, direction and review; their accountability is thus to the centre for the adequate 
performance of such functions.  
 
To be clearly distinguished from decentralisation is deconcentration, the administrative 
decentralization of power within the central government to local administrative offices under 
the direct control of the central government. Although the central government may give 
regional officials a wide discretion, the latter is directly accountable to the centre and not the 
people in the region that they serve. Although deconcentration is sometimes mentioned in the 
literature as a form of decentralization, in terms of our definition of decentralization, this 
form of governance does not meet the criteria of democratically elected bodies exercising 
final decision-making powers.  
 
Our definition is aligned with the African Charter on Democracy which requires that ‘State 
Parties shall decentralize power to democratically elected local authorities as provided in 
national laws’.48 This approach was reaffirmed in the AU’s Charter on Decentralisation 
where the principles of decentralisation include:  
Local governments or local authorities shall in accordance with national law, have the 
powers, to in an accountable and transparent manner, manage, manage their 
administration and finances through democratically elected, deliberative assemblies 
and executive organs.49 
Although the Charter asserts on the one hand the legislative authority of local governments, it 
subjects such authority to the hierarchy of the national law and regulations.50 
 
The objects of local government are much the same as those ascribed to federalism. The first 
is realising democracy from the bottom up. The African Charter on Decentralisation 
proclaims in its preamble that local governments ‘are key cornerstones of any democratic 
governance system’.51 The particular importance of local democracy is that it can readily be 
participatory in nature.52 The establishment of democratic governance at a subnational level 
not only provides a legitimate basis for local government, but also allows for a democratic 
ethos to permeate the entire polity from the bottom up. The second object of local 
government is development. In South Africa local government is thus defined as 
‘developmental local government’.53 Through the equitable distribution of resources to local 
authorities and, there, matching expenditure with local preferences, the argument is that 
development will be more effective. One of objects of the African Charter on 
Decentralisation is also promoting ‘resource mobilisation and local economic development 
with the view of eradicating poverty in Africa.’54 The third object is that local government 
can, to a limited extent, also serve as a vehicle to accommodate diversity.55 This is a 
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principled object in the ethnic federation of Ethiopia,56 and implicitly in Kenya’s 47 county 
configuration. 
 
As with federalism, effective decentralisation at local government level is also largely 
dependent on the presence of constitutionalism, although the constitutionalisation of local 
government is yet neither the norm nor required by the African Charter on 
Decentralisation.57 First, local democracy thrives within a larger democratic ethos that also 
respects local democratic outcomes. Secondly, local autonomy is based on the principled 
acceptance of limited government at the centre, now running along a vertical axis. Thirdly, 
‘developmental local government’ flowers within transformative constitutionalism of which 
it is a constitutive part. Finally, autonomous decision-making depends on adherence to the 
rule of law: respect for the allocation of local government powers, support for its institutions, 
and the resolution of disputes with the centre ultimately by an independent judiciary.  
 
3.3 Traditional authorities 
 
Traditional authorities are those social institutions that pre-date colonialism as endogenous 
forms of governance, based on both hereditary or elected leaders, appointed and governing in 
terms of customary law. The governance role varies across Africa but include a direct 
governance role in the absence of a state presence, land-use management in communal areas 
falling under their jurisdiction, facilitation and support of formal government structures and 
programmes, and the administration of customary law. The African Charter on Elections, 
with its focus on democracy, inevitably gave cautious recognition to their role: ‘Given the 
enduring and vital role of traditional authorities, particularly in rural communities, the State 
Parties shall strive to find appropriate ways and means to increase their integration and 
effectiveness within the larger democratic society.’58 In contrast, the African Charter on 
Decentralisation says not a single word about traditional leaders, and they thus are not seen 
as part of the decentralisation project. 
 
Whereas federations and local government thrive in and bolsters constitutionalism, traditional 
authorities contradict the essence of some of the basic tenets. Hereditary leadership is per se 
undemocratic, the patriarchal system offends the basic principles of equality, and the 
unwritten customary rules sit uncomfortably in a rule of law system which requires written 
rules (particularly in a Francophone context). Despite these inherent contradictions, 
traditional leaders are increasingly seen as key players in the development of rural areas.   
4. Implementing Decentralisation: the challenge of constitutionalism 
 
4.1 The dominance of the centralism 
The allure of liberal-democratic constitutionalism has been in reaction to highly autocratic 
states which broke few limits on executive powers, were intolerant of multi-party democracy, 
negated human rights, and transmogrified the rule of law into the rule through law. 
Development was inequitable, with the well-being of the imperial president and his group the 
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primary focus. The 1990s’ wave of democracy has ebbed and the Charter on Elections is still 
a far cry from its realisation. The dominant practice is still that of a dominant executive, often 
still clothed in imperial trappings of personalised rule. Electoral competition obtained in 
“illiberal democracies”59 or “semi-democracies”, where authoritarian practices and violation 
of human rights remain common place.60 The single party in control was ‘replaced by the 
dominant parties operating in exactly the same reckless and arbitrary manner as the post-
independence singly party systems’.61 A strong presidency still dominates both the legislature 
and the judiciary. Human rights are more often violated than protected. The rule of law is 
more the rule through law; the constitution rather than a restraint on government is an 
enabler.  
As such, there is no clear articulation of a competing vision of present day constitutional 
practice which justifies the centrality of an imperial presidency. There are no longer post-
independent politicians and theorists expounding the virtues of  the centrist state for nation 
building and development.62 As the theory of national unity and development is threadbare, 
the competing model of ‘centrism’ is informed by a number of factors. In countries which 
experienced wars of national liberation, the liberation movements cling to a notion of 
entitlement to govern and that the state is their legitimate spoils of war. In most cases the 
pervasive factor is the neo-patrimonial state. In contrast to Western countries where the state 
is separate but protective of the market, in the patrimonial state there is no split; the state 
dominates the economy.63 Following on from the colonial patrimonial state, where it was not 
used for the benefit of the citizens but for the metropole, the new patrimonialism of the post-
independence African state is not much  different; the state is a vehicle for the self-
advancement of the ruling elite located in the presidency and his or her affiliated group. 
Multiparty elections are not a contest of which party will serve the nation best, but all about 
‘our turn to eat’.64 Elections are thus manipulated, limits on state action minimized, and the 
rule of law a hindrance that can be overcome with the support of a compliant or corrupt 
judiciary. The result is the ‘self-serving state’,65 manifested by corruption, underdevelopment 
and, consequently, conflict. 
This competing vision of the state not only undermines constitutionalism, also but also has 
profound effects on the implementation of decentralisation. 
4.2 Federalism and its challenges 
In highly divided African countries federal-type arrangements have been tried as a solution to 
enduring conflicts, most of which stemmed from ethnic/religious-mobilisation. Since the 
1990s federal-type systems have emerged in South Africa (1994); Ethiopia (1995); Nigeria 
(1999, re-establishing earlier federal constitutions); the Comoros (1996, 2001); the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (2005); the Sudan (2005), Kenya (2010); South Sudan (2011) 
and Somalia (2012). In most of them, where conflict was driven by ethnically mobilized 
groups (usually because of exclusion from state resources and inequitable development), 
federalism was the containment strategy of holding the country together. The South African 
interim Constitution of 1993 heralded the transition from white minority rule and a low 
intensity civil war to a constitutional democracy, but also accommodated secessionist 
tendencies among Zulu and Afrikaner nationalists. The Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 
flowing from the military defeat of the Mengistu’s totalitarian regime constructed an ethnic-
based federation. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution restored both civilian rule and federalism 
after two decades of military rule, with the 36 states as a strategy to diffuse the inherent 
tension between the four main ethnic/religious groups. The 2001 Comoros Constitution 
followed the return to civilian rule after the 20th military coup d’état or attempt at such since 
independence in 1975 to bring peace between different island identities. The 2005 peace-
treaty and interim constitution of the Sudan ended two decades of civil war which pitted the 
African/Christian South against the Arabic/Muslim north. The 2005 DRC Constitution 
brought to an end an internationalized civil war by, among other measures, devolved powers 
to largely ethnic-based provinces. The constitution-making process in Kenya, culminating in 
the 2010 Constitution, gained traction after the ethnic clashes that followed the contested 
2007 presidential elections and inadvertently provides for 47 ethnic enclaves.  After the 2011 
referendum South Sudan became independent following a peaceful referendum in terms of 
the Sudan’s interim constitution of 2005, but has since then collapsed in an ethnic-based civil 
war. The transitional Federal Constitution of Somalia of 2012 seeks to bring this failed state 
back to life, through a federal dispensation that currently builds on the clan system. 
Whereas it was argued above that federalism gives full expression to constitutionalism, the 
reverse is equally true; the functioning of federal systems in Africa is curtailed in practice by 
the very absence or superficiality of the various components of constitutionalism. A number 
of challenges to the implementation of federalism can thus be identified:  
 
First, the tolerance of democratic government at sub-national level faces considerable socio-
political obstacles. Although multi-party elections take place, an authentic subnational voice 
is not always heard. Where the pre-1990 single party has morphed into the dominant party, 
the latter through a strong hierarchical party structure, ensures accountability upwards rather 
than horizontally. In Ethiopia, the dominance of the EPRFD, which has captured all seats at 
both federal and state level, has effectively hollowed out the federal democratic structures 
through the fusion of party and state. For more than two decades a centrist ANC has 
governed through hierarchical party rule, eight of the nine provinces.  
 
Secondly, the notion of limited central power remains an anathema to most federal 
governments; the overwhelming ethos and goal remain that of an all-powerful centre. 
Evidence of the prevalence of this ethos is to be found in the very constitutions establishing 
the subnational states, effecting only ‘fragile federalism’.66 The key characteristics of this 
style of federalism are: the fracturing of subnational governments into numerous small units; 
a limited devolution of powers (mainly through concurrent powers which are then dominated 
by the centre); centralising taxing powers and rendering subnational governments dependent 
on transfers; the central dominance of intergovernmental relations; and extensive intervention 
powers. These ‘fragile’ federal arrangements came about as compromises struck between a 
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central governing elite and polities at the periphery; such compromises the former never fully 
embraced and constantly seeks to undo. 
 
Thirdly, in some federations the federal arrangements have to take root in the absence of the 
rule of law. At the most basic level, parties to a peace accord establishing a federal solution to 
an on-going conflict do not honour their signature to such accords. The tragic story of South 
Sudan can be traced back to repeated breaches of peace agreements between the North and 
South, and now within the South. Even where federal arrangements are captured in a 
constitution and legislation, a reckless disregard for the rules of the game is often 
encountered. In a number of federations the courts provide little protection of sub-national 
autonomy, and show deference to the centre rather than their own independence and 
impartiality. In some countries there is no or weak constitutional review by the courts. In 
Ethiopia, for example, a political body, the House of Federations, the second house of the 
federal parliament, is the interpreter of the Constitution including its federal provisions. The 
operationalisation of the federal arrangements in Somalia has to proceed in the absence of a 
constitutional court or a functioning judiciary. 
   
Fourthly, decentralisation takes place in a national ethos of neo-patrimonialism; the state is 
not there for developing the country as a whole but to serve the narrow interest of a political  
elite. Subnational governments, hailed as the panacea for past injustices of 
underdevelopment, fall in the same trap when local elites capture the local state.  
 
In summary, the federal peace dividend is unlikely to materialise in the absence of 
constitutionalism. The very fact that federal constitutions were a peace-making device, 
ending decades of some of the world’s most horrendous wars and authoritarian regimes, was 
in itself indicative of the absence of democracy, limited government, the rule of law, and the 
presence of partisan development. The prize of capturing and maintaining central power 
seems to override federal peace-making objectives. Because constitutionalism is an 
uncomfortable restraint on the exercise of centralised power, federal arrangements as a 
pragmatic solution to conflict have not been implemented and put to the test, and past 
conflicts persist.  
 
4.3 Developmental local government and constitutionalism  
With the end of the Cold War, a triumphalist West premised development and economic 
growth on implementing the Washington Consensus which entailed a market economy, a 
reduced central government, privatisation, and decentralisation. The latter strategy was 
enthusiastically pursued by key international development agencies such as UNDP, the 
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, which both prescribed decentralisation 
structures and strategies and pumped billions of dollars into the developing world for this 
purpose.67 This impetus prompted also a new home-grown interest in local governments. 
Spurred on, no doubt, by Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance project, a continental-wide 
local government association, the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) 
was established in 2005, with the founding meeting attended by 52 countries and a number of 
heads of state. UCLGA combined existing Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone local 
government associations,68 but its ambitious programme soon floundered on the rocks of the 
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old enmity between the Anglophone and Francophone views on local government: is local 
government a self-standing institution or an appendage of the central state.  
As is the case with federations, the autonomous functioning of local governments is also tied 
up to the health of the national constitutionalism enterprise. Where there is only sham 
democracy at the centre, little can be expected at the local level. Even if there is multiparty 
democracy at national level, democracy is not always tolerated at the local level. In the 
Francophone system, which is predicated on a centralised administration which effects 
upward accountability rather than to local constituencies, mayors are still centrally appointed, 
reflecting the old prefecture system. Even in the Anglophone countries full effect is not given 
to democratic outcomes. In Botswana and Zimbabwe (before the 2013 Constitution) the 
president appoints a percentage of councillors to democratically elected councils. The 
presidential power of removing democratically elected mayors and councils is also a common 
feature. The tolerance of an opposition party exercising state power is not widely accepted. 
When the opposition party won control of Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, the city 
administration was summarily nationalized.69 Where local elections are routinely held, Erk 
points out, the workings of local governments are, in a one dominant party system, dictated 
not by local concerns but by national party interests.70 The prime examples is the EPRDF 
iron grip on all subnational governments in Ethiopia which has not produced local 
accountability, the very point of devolving democracy.71 
Even where democracy at local level is tolerated, the notion that local authorities could in fact 
be governments, making final decisions, and thus impose a limitation on central power, is 
highly contested, and, in the final analysis, restricted. First, local government’s place in the 
structure of the state is most often not entrenched in constitutions, with a few exceptions: 
(Namibia (1990), South Africa (1993, 1996), Uganda (1995), Nigeria (1999), Zimbabwe 
(2013), Tunisia (2014), and Zambia (2016)). The level of such protection of local autonomy 
varies considerably, from detailed provisions in the South African 1996 Constitution to a 
minimalist approach in Namibia. In most countries local authorities are established by statute, 
which is also the underlying assumption of the African Charter on Decentralisation. As 
‘creatures of statute’ local governments are most often subject to central regulation and 
control, a position which is further exacerbated by their dependency on national transfers. 
Overall, local governments function in the main as agents of the central state at grass roots 
level.  
Where the rule of law is no more than a goal, a rule driven local government will equally be a 
chimera. Conversely, the presence of the rule of law empowers local government.72 Even 
where there is a prevailing ethos of governance through rules, local government may 
undermine this ethos by its shear inability to comply with the imposed legal framework. The 
structures and processes imposed by central government, however well designed, are not, or 
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cannot, be implemented by a poorly skilled administration, resulting inevitably in a state of 
lawlessness.73 
Whether local government can fulfil its developmental goal is dependent a number of factors, 
some determined by the centre, others lie in its own hands. Within a centralised fiscal system, 
the resources available to local governments depends largely on the generosity, or not, of the 
central government; having control over most sources of revenue, a lack of support from the 
central government is a common complaint in most countries. With scarce resources at hand 
and an upward accountability for whatever handouts are received, the very rationale for 
decentralisation – matching development measures with local preferences through horizontal 
democratic accountability to the constituency - is thwarted. Operating within a national ethos 
of a patrimonial state, local governments readily replicated and amplified it, making 
development an unlikely outcome. 
4.4 Traditional leaders and constitutionalism 
Given the considerable obstacles described above, it is not surprising that the decentralisation 
initiatives have not been uniformly successful. The failure is also attributed to the imposition 
of foreign-designed institutions and processes which were, as a result, not context 
compatible.74 Part of the missing context is the role of traditional leaders. 
During the colonial period traditional authorities played an important governance role in 
British colonies through the so-called system of ‘indirect rule’, while in the French colonies 
they were marginalised through the system of direct administrative rule. In the post-
independence period of centralized rule and its modernization project, Anglophone countries 
side-stepped traditional leaders because of their collaborative role under colonial rule, their 
perceived backwardness, and the intolerance of any competing sources of power. In the 
Francophone countries, the French colonial state’s strictly hierarchical rule gave little or no 
space to traditional authorities,75 an approach which continued after independence.76 
Traditional authorities were perceived as competing centres of power and the new rulers 
sought to marginalise them in the name of de-ethnicising post-independence countries.77  
Jan Erk points out the irony that the decentralisation push of the 1990s blew ‘new life into 
some of the traditional authorities who had remained politically dormant until the creation 
and strengthening of local government.’78 With the focus on the local state, they could exert 
their authority effectively in the ‘smaller settings’ of local authorities, particularly where the 
latter failed to deliver services effectively.79 However, due to the different Anglophone and 
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Francophone approaches to traditional authorities during the colonial period, the latter 
withered away and did not revive during the last two decades.80 
Opinion on the role of traditional leaders is deeply divided. On the one hand, they are viewed 
as corrupt, illiberal, and an obstacle to modernisation of the state and development. On the 
other hand, there are increasingly pragmatic voices that recognize the value of their 
legitimacy and the enormous resource in their hands – the control of land in rural areas. 
Given that the traditional authority system remains deeply ingrained in the fabric or rural life, 
and, as Tinashe Chigwata argues, in the absence of a capable state in local level, they should 
play a governance role and be integrated into the modern state.81 They are thus seen as 
necessary stakeholders in the implementation of development programmes. 
The role and place of traditional leaders are context specific. In the absence of a central 
government (such as Somalia) they govern in a true expression of decentralisation, making 
final decisions over a wide range of matters. In countries (such as the DRC) where the reach 
of the central state is limited a similar practice is evident. Where constitutionalism has a 
foothold, the question has been how to integrate the traditional leaders into a modern 
democracy without negating the core elements of constitutionalism. 
Within a democratic governance framework traditional leaders are assigned a consultative 
rather than a decision-making role in formal legislative processes. This may take the form of 
a House of Traditional Leaders that must be consulted on matters affecting customary law. 
Traditional leaders may also have deliberative but not voting rights in local councils, as is the 
case in South Africa. The principle is that the traditional voice must be heard but it may not 
dictate. Final decision-making powers are, however, accorded to traditional leaders in the 
areas of communal land and adjudication of customary law. Although customary law is 
unwritten (running against the grain of the Francophone system of codification), it may be 
aligned by superior courts to the basic principles of equality and fundamental rights. The 
strongest claim for the merger of traditional leadership into governance structures or 
processes is that they would assist in building the capable state in the face of weak local 
government institutions.82  
5. Decentralisation and the advancement of constitutionalism 
The relationship between constitutionalism and decentralisation is not only one of 
dependency; a state of constitutionalism allows local government to thrive. The effective 
implementation of decentralisation also bolsters constitutionalism as it reinforces the core 
elements of this ideology. Thus, in countries where constitutionalism is not merely a goal, but 
in varying degrees a lived reality, subnational governments and polities may further enhance 
and deepen its realisation. A few examples will suffice.  
In Botswana which has the longest track record of multiparty democracy in Africa, local 
government exposed its Achilles heel. When the President appointed in 1984 an additional 19 
percent of the councillors to a local council which his party lost in an election, the ruling 
party regained control of the council. Although the president was legally permitted to do so, 
the local community protested vehemently, forcing the ruling party to cede back control to 
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the opposition, and thereby respect the basic rule of democracy. In South Africa the 
unanswered question has been whether the ANC, as liberation movement, would honour a 
negative result at the national polls. It’s conduct at local government level suggests that it 
would; in August 2016 it gracefully and without demur handed over the reigns of the two 
most powerful metropolitan councils – Johannesburg and Pretoria – to opposition parties.  
The conduct of subnational governments in South Africa and Namibia has affirmed the 
notion of limited government despite the hegemony of a dominant party. In a rare moment of 
dissent, some ANC-controlled provinces in 2015 defeated, through their participation in the 
National Council of Provinces (the second house of Parliament), a government-sponsored bill 
on traditional courts. In neighbouring Namibia which has an even more dominant political 
party, SWAPO, a government-sponsored bill, which would have would have further 
centralised control over municipalities, was rejected in 2016 by the Regional Council, the 
second house of Parliament and representing the regions. Despite the fact that the bill  was  
approved by the National Assembly, the regions, all of which are controlled by SWAPO, 
made their voices heard without having their heads on the block. In both cases dissent within 
the dominant party from below bolstered, not only the federal value of accommodating local 
voices, but also the notion of checks and balances within the legislative process.   
The relationship becomes more problematic when there is no, or very weak, 
constitutionalism. Ronald Watts has observed that in post-conflict countries where federal 
arrangements are used to secure a peace dividend, the absence of the necessary ‘federal 
conditions’ makes its achievement very remote: ‘The lack of trust, willingness to 
compromise, and respect for constitutionality, has made it difficult to obtain accommodation 
or to operate a federal institution effectively.’83 Watts then poses the following conundrum: 
‘whether a federal political culture can be created as a result of establishing a federations, or 
is a prior requisite’?84 Watts’s answer is not entirely negative; he refers to both the US and 
Switzerland where fully-fledged federations with a supportive political culture were formed 
despite severe periods of conflict. The question in Africa is then: can the practice of 
decentralisation enhance or even establish the roots of constitutionalism? Is bootstraps 
constitutionalism possible? Can constituent units of federations play a formative role? Can 
local governments play a similar role?  
The obvious manifestation of a lack of constitutionalism is the non- or partial enforcement of 
those constitutions which embody all the necessary elements of constitutionalism. Why this 
pervasive gap between constitutions and their implementation? The most persuasive theory, 
advanced by Yash Ghai,85 is that such constitutions do not yet reflect a true social compact of 
key stakeholders in the respective societies. If they did, these stakeholders would have a 
material interest in constitutional enforcement. It is thus only with the growth of stakeholders 
independent of the state – private sector, labour, professions and civil society – that such a 
compact is possible and will be enforced. I have argued that in federal systems a key 
stakeholder has been added - the constituent units;  if not captured by the centre, they have 
both the interest and capacity to enforce the federal compact, and set the floor for the rule of 
law.86  
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Local governments and local polities may play an equally important role. When the Nigeria 
military regime sought to return to democracy in the late 1980s local democracy was key to 
the process. In 1996 it first ran  a local government election based on a zero-party basis, the 
winners of which had to vacate office a year later when multi-party local elections were 
held.87 Although it was a top-down manipulation of a bottom up approach, it nevertheless 
suggests where the roots of democracy should lie. This is also the approach of the African 
Charter on Decentralisation, which views local democracy as the ‘cornerstone’ of any 
democratic system.88  
 
The absence of a functioning independent judicial system, the very cornerstone of the rule of 
law, is hugely problematic in new federations where there is a deep mistrust that parties will 
honour the compromises struck with regard to the dispersal of power. In the absence of such 
an institution tasked with enforcing the rules, is the notion of the rule of law meaningless? 
Does the absence of a functioning, legitimate supreme court render the Somali quest for a 
peaceful transition through federalism wishful thinking? The first and obvious response is 
that the two processes – building federal institutions and a judicial system – has to occur at 
the same time. Yet, it may not help the initial and most crucial steps towards a new 
constitutional dispensation. It is argued that a commitment to the rule of law starts earlier; the 
words on paper agreements must reflect the integrity of the parties and their commitment to 
the foedus, the federal compact. The need for such integrity calls out from South Sudan. 
Despite regional and international efforts to enforce the peace agreements, the civil war is 
testimony to the fact that signatures beneath agreements are, and have been, mere scribbles in 
the sand. 
6. Conclusion 
The conference will explore the relationship between decentralisation of constitutionalism. It 
should examine in a comparative and case specific manner the hypotheses that I have 
outlined above. First, the effective implementation of decentralisation and the achievement of 
its goals is much dependent on the realisation of constitutionalism at a national level. Without 
such an enabling environment, decentralisation is likely to falter. Secondly, because 
decentralisation incorporates elements of constitutionalism, its realisation bolsters and 
buttresses constitutionalism. Thirdly, decentralisation may also hold the potential to 
strengthen and even provide roots where constitutionalism is weak or non-existent. Overall, I 
would argue that there is a ‘mutually beneficial relationship between decentralisation and 
constitutionalism as one reinforces the other.  
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